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Rest in Peace, Rule 505
By Wendy Gerwick Couture*
After 37 years in existence,1 the Rule 505 exemption from
registration has been repealed, effective May 22, 2017. This essay reviews the evolution of Rule 505 over its lifetime; examines
Rule 505’s role within Regulation D and analyzes why that role
eventually became obsolete; and argues that Rule 505 leaves
behind a legacy that should continue to inform policy discussions
about exemptions from registration.
I. Evolution of Rule 505
Rule 505 was a small issue offering exemption, adopted under
§ 3(b) of the Securities Act (now § 3(b)(1)), which authorizes the
SEC to exempt a class of securities from the registration requirement “if it ﬁnds that the enforcement of this subchapter with respect to such securities is not necessary in the public interest and
for the protection of investors by reason of the small amount
involved or the limited character of the public offering.”2 The
SEC adopted Rule 242, the predecessor to Rule 505, on January
17, 1980.3 Two years later, the SEC adopted Regulation D (“Reg.
D”), repealing Rule 242 and replacing it with Rule 505.4 Although
the exemption was amended numerous times since 1980, its core
elements remained largely unchanged: (a) a limitation on aggregate offering price; (b) a limitation on the number and nature of
purchasers; (c) a mandatory disclosure requirement; (d) a prohibition on general solicitation or advertising; and (e) a bad actor
disqualiﬁcation.
(a) Limitation on Aggregate Offering Price
Section 3(b) caps the aggregate offering price that issuers can
raise under a small issue offering exemption promulgated
thereunder. In early 1980, when Rule 242 was adopted, the statutory cap was $2 million,5 and Rule 242 incorporated that cap by
reference.6 Later that year, Congress passed the Small Business
Investment Incentive Act of 1980, which raised the § 3(b) cap to
$5 million.7 Accordingly, in 1982, when the SEC replaced Rule
242 with Rule 505, the SEC speciﬁed that the aggregate offering
price “shall not exceed $5,000,000, less the aggregate offering
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price for all securities sold within the twelve months before the
start of and during the offering of securities under this section in
reliance on any exemption under section 3(b) of the Act or in
violation of section 5(a) of the Act.”8 Rule 505’s limitation on aggregate offering price remained unchanged from 1982 until its
repeal in 2017.
(b) Limitation on Number and Nature of Purchasers
Rule 242 limited the number of “purchasers” to 35,9 and Rule
505 continued this limitation.10 Importantly, however, both Rule
242 and Rule 505 excluded certain investors from the deﬁnition
of “purchaser,” including any person qualifying as “accredited.”11
Although the 35-purchaser limitation remained in place from
1980 until the rule’s repeal in 2017, the deﬁnition of “accredited”
investor evolved over time, most notably with respect to the inclusion of institutional investors and wealthy individuals.
The scope of institutional investors qualifying as “accredited”
expanded over time. In 1980, Rule 242 deﬁned a limited number
of institutional investors as “accredited”: certain banks, insurance companies, employee beneﬁt plans, and investment
companies.12 In 1982, when the SEC replaced Rule 242 with Rule
505, it expanded the deﬁnition to include certain private business
development companies, 501(c)(3) organizations, and entities in
which all of the equity owners qualiﬁed as accredited investors
themselves.13 In 1988, the SEC expanded the scope even further
to include certain savings and loan associations; credit unions;
broker-dealers; and corporations, partnerships, and trusts with
total assets in excess of $5 million.14 The SEC explained that
there did “not appear to be a compelling reason” to distinguish
these institutional investors from those already qualifying as
accredited. 15 In 1989, the SEC expanded the scope again to
include governmental plans, placing them “on the same footing
as employee plans which are subject to ERISA.”16
The scope of wealthy individuals qualifying as “accredited”
likewise evolved, sometimes expanding and sometimes
contracting. In 1980, Rule 242 provided only one avenue for
wealthy individuals to qualify as “accredited” merely by virtue of
their wealth, deﬁning as accredited “any person who purchases
$100,000 or more of securities of the issuer” in the offering for
cash, an obligation to pay within 60 days of the ﬁrst issuance of
the securities, or the cancellation of indebtedness owed by the issuer to the purchaser.17 As the SEC later explained, the premise
“was that a person capable of investing a large amount of capital
. . . in an offering ought to be considered an accredited investor.”18
In 1982, when the SEC replaced Rule 242 with Rule 505, it
retained the ability of a person to qualify as accredited by virtue
134
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of the size of the person’s investment but raised the investment
level from $100,000 to $150,000; added the caveat that the
purchaser’s total investment must not exceed 20% of the
purchaser’s net worth at the time of sale; and expanded the acceptable consideration paid by the purchaser to include securities
with readily available market quotations and obligations to be
paid within ﬁve years of the sale of the securities to the
purchaser.19 In 1982, the SEC also added two new avenues for
natural persons to qualify as accredited by virtue of their wealth:
(1) having a net worth, either individually or jointly with a
spouse, of $1 million;20 or (2) earning an individual income in
excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years and reasonably expecting an income in excess of $200,000 in the current
year.21 In 1988, the SEC eliminated the $150,000 purchase test,
acknowledging that it was an imprecise measure of wealth and
that most purchasers qualifying under the purchase test would
likewise qualify under the wealth or income tests.22 The SEC also
expanded the income test to include joint income with one’s
spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of the two most recent years
and a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level
in the current year.23 Finally, in 2011, in response to a mandate
in the Dodd-Frank Wall State Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),24 the SEC excluded the equity in an investor’s principal residence from the net worth calculation.25
(c) Mandatory Disclosures
From its inception, Rule 505 (and its predecessor Rule 242)
imposed mandatory disclosure requirements if an issuer sold securities to non-accredited investors; if issuers were selling only to
accredited investors, Rule 505 did not mandate any disclosures.26
From 1980 to 1989, if an issuer made sales to both accredited
and non-accredited investors, the issuer was required to provide
the mandated disclosures to both sets of investors.27 In 1989, consistent with the general rationale that accredited investors are
able to fend for themselves, the SEC omitted this requirement
and mandated disclosures only to non-accredited investors.28
The content of the mandatory disclosures to non-accredited
investors became more graduated over time. In 1980, Rule 242
(which imposed an aggregate offering price limit of $2 million)
mandated a certain level of disclosure to non-accredited investors, regardless of the size of the offering.29 In 1982, when the
SEC replaced Rule 242 with Rule 505 and raised the aggregate
offering price limit to $5 million, the SEC retained a singular
disclosure requirement for offerings up to $5 million.30 In 1988,
the SEC introduced a more graduated disclosure requirement,
relaxing the disclosures required by issuers raising up to $2
million.31 The SEC explained: “[I]t appears that there would be
© 2017 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2017
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some beneﬁt to another level of disclosure under the regulation
as long as investor protection is not being compromised.”32 This
graduated disclosure regime, which differentiated between offerings raising up to $2 million and those raising more money,
remained in effect for Rule 505 offerings until the rule’s repeal.
(d) Prohibition on General Solicitation or Advertising
From the outset, Rule 505 (and its predecessor Rule 242)
prohibited general solicitation or advertising.33 This prohibition
was consistent was the SEC’s explanation when adopting another
§ 3(b) exemption that, absent this prohibition, “an exemption
cannot be justiﬁed on the basis of the ‘limited character’ of the
offering.”34
(e) Bad Actor Disqualiﬁcation
From the beginning, Rule 505 (and its predecessor Rule 242)
disqualiﬁed certain so-called “bad actors” from relying on the
exemption, incorporating Regulation A’s bad actor prohibition.35
In 1980, when adopting Rule 242, the SEC explained that “it
believes that this safeguard is necessary in light of the experimental nature of Rule 242.”36 The SEC retained this bad actor
disqualiﬁcation when adopting Rule 505 as part of Reg. D, despite the absence of comparable provisions in the other Reg. D
exemptions at that time.37
II. Role of Rule 505
From the outset, Rule 505 (and its predecessor Rule 242)
worked in concert with Rule 504 (and its predecessor Rule 240)
and Rule 506 (and its predecessor Rule 146). Rule 242, which
was adopted in 1980, was the last of this trio to be adopted.38
Rule 146 was adopted in 1974 as a safe harbor under § 4(2) (now
§ 4(a)(2)),39 and Rule 240 was adopted in 1975 pursuant to § 3(b)
(now § 3(b)(1)). 40 When the SEC adopted Reg. D in 1982, it
replaced Rules 240, 242, and 146 with Rules 504, 505, and 506,
respectively.41 By combining these three exemptions within Reg.
D, the SEC sought “to simplify existing rules and regulations, to
eliminate any unnecessary restrictions that those rules and
regulations place on issuers, particularly small businesses, and
to achieve uniformity between state and federal exemptions in order to facilitate capital formation consistent with the protection
of investors.”42 The eventual obsolescence of Rule 505 is a result
of the changing relationship among the three Reg. D exemptions.
(a) Relationship Among Rules 504, 505, and 506
When adopting Rule 242 (the predecessor of Rule 505), the
SEC sought to ﬁll a gap left by Rule 240 (the predecessor of Rule
504) and Rule 146 (the predecessor of Rule 506). In particular,
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commentators had criticized Rule 240 as being “of limited utility
because it is available only for offerings of $100,000 or less in 12
months by an issuer whose securities are owned beneﬁcially by
not more than 100 persons.” 43 Likewise, commentators had
criticized Rule 146 because it “requires the issuer to make a
subjective determination as to the sophistication of each offeree
and each purchaser.”44 Rule 242 addressed both of these criticisms by allowing issuers to raise more funds than permitted by
Rule 24045 and by omitting any requirement that the issuer make
a subjective determination about the sophistication of offerees or
purchasers.46
When the SEC replaced Rules 240, 242, and 146 with Rules
504, 505, and 506, respectively, and compiled them in Reg. D, the
three Reg. D exemptions were meant to operate as a stair-step,
increasing investor protections as the size of offerings increased,
with Rule 505 in the middle. 47 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr.
explained Reg. D’s stair-step approach as follows: “[I]nvestor
protection devices—disclosure and sophistication requirements—
generate signiﬁcant transaction costs for issuers, and since relative rather than absolute transaction costs choke off capital
formation, a sensible balance between capital formation and investor protection leads to the imposition of additional investor
protection requirements as deals get larger.”48
A key assumption of Reg. D’s stair-step approach was that Reg.
D would operate as “a basic framework of limited offering exemptions that can apply uniformly at the federal and state levels.”49
The SEC envisioned that Rule 504 offerings would be registered
at the state level: “Because of the small amount of the offering
and the likelihood that sales will occur in a limited geographic
area, the Commission and NASAA [the North American Securities Administrators Association] believe that greater reliance on
state securities laws is appropriate.”50 By contrast, the SEC
envisioned that Rule 505 and Rule 506 offerings would operate as
“uniform federal-state exemptions.”51
Even at the time of Reg. D’s adoption, however, the gap to be
ﬁlled by Rule 505 was narrowed, undercutting the intended stairstep approach. Rule 504 was less restrictive than its predecessor
Rule 240 in several respects, lessening the incentives for issuers
to select Rule 505 rather than Rule 504. First, Rule 504’s aggregate offering price limit was raised to $500,000,52 as opposed to
$100,000 under Rule 240.53 Second, Rule 504 provided a pathway
for issuers to engage in general solicitation or advertising,54 unlike Rule 240’s ﬂat prohibition on general solicitation or
advertising.55 Third, unlike Rule 240,56 Rule 504 did not impose a
limit on the number of beneﬁcial owners.57 Finally, Rule 504
eliminated Rule 240’s prohibition on the payment of
© 2017 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2017
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commissions.58
Likewise, Rule 506 was less restrictive than its predecessor
Rule 146 in two key ways, strengthening the incentive for issuers
to choose Rule 506 rather than Rule 505. First, Rule 146 had
required issuers to reasonably believe that all offerees either (1)
had such knowledge and experience in ﬁnancial and business
matters that they were capable of evaluating the merits and
risks of the investment; or (2) were able to “bear the economic
risk of the investment.”59 Rule 506 eliminated any requirement
for issuers to assess their offerees’ knowledge, experience, or ability to bear economic risk.60 Second, Rule 146 had required issuers
to reasonably believe that all purchasers either (1) had such
knowledge and experience in ﬁnancial and business matters that
they were capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the investment; or (2) together with their representatives had such knowledge and experience and were able to bear the economic risk of
the investment.61 With respect to accredited purchasers, Rule 506
eliminated the requirement for issuers to assess their knowledge
or sophistication.62 With respect to non-accredited purchasers,
Rule 506 eliminated the economic risk test, retaining only the
requirement that issuers reasonably believe that the purchasers
either alone or with a representative have the requisite knowledge and experience in ﬁnancial or business matters that they
are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment.63
Indeed, data compiled by the SEC from the ﬁrst year of Reg.
D’s existence demonstrates that issuers, even at that time,
preferred Rules 506 and 504 to Rule 505. From April 15, 1982, to
April 14, 1983, 49% of Reg. D offerings proceeded under Rule
506; 25% proceeded under Rule 504; 13% proceeded under Rule
505; and 13% claimed more than one exemption.64 In addition,
the SEC noted that over 90% of Rule 506 offerings were for less
than $5 million and commented that “[f]or many of these offerings it seems a Rule 505 exemption could have been claimed.”65
Over time, as Rules 504 and 506 became even more issuerfriendly, Rule 505 was effectively squeezed out. First, efforts to
harmonize state regulation of Rules 505 and 506 fell short, and
Congress preempted state regulation of offerings under Rule 506
but not under Rule 505.66 This made Rule 506 even more attractive than Rule 505 in most contexts. Second, the SEC gradually
raised Rule 504’s aggregate offering price limit, further lessening
the attractiveness of Rule 505 as an alternative to Rule 504.67
(b) Preemption of State Regulation of Rule 506 Offerings
The ﬁrst disruption of Reg. D’s stair-step approach was the
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preemption of state regulation of Rule 506 offerings but not Rule
505 offerings. As discussed above, the SEC intended Rules 505
and 506 to operate as “uniform federal-state exemptions.”68 The
SEC, together with the NASAA, planned to accomplish this via a
Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (“ULOE”), which would
serve as a companion state-level exemption to Rules 505 and
506.69 The quest to implement uniform federal-state exemptions
proved elusive, however.
In 1983, NASAA promulgated the ULOE as planned, but it did
not perfectly mirror Rules 505 and 506. Most importantly with
respect to Rule 505, the ULOE imposed an additional requirement for sales to non-accredited investors.70 Under the ULOE, issuers had to reasonably believe either (1) that the “investment is
suitable for the purchaser upon the basis of the facts, if any,
disclosed by the purchaser as to his other security holding and as
to his ﬁnancial situation and needs”; or (2) that the purchaser
alone or with his representative has such knowledge and experience in ﬁnancial and business matters that he or she is “capable
of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment.”71
Moreover, although by 1996 the vast majority of states had
adopted some form of the ULOE,72 it was far from uniform, as
“[b]attles won or lost at the NASAA level could be refought at the
individual state level.”73 States, “because of fundamental differences in philosophy concerning securities regulation,”74 varied
with respect to “ﬁling and notice requirements, application of
‘bad actor’ disqualiﬁcation provisions, suitability standards, ﬁling
deadlines, and required disclosure.”75 In short, issuers seeking to
rely on Rule 505 or Rule 506 in multi-state offerings were
required to survey, and comply with, myriad differing blue sky
provisions.
In light of the failure of Rules 505 and 506 to operate as
uniform federal-state exemptions, pressure grew on Congress to
intervene. In 1995, Representative Jack Fields introduced a bill
that would have “preempted all pre-sale state regulation of securities offerings other than intrastate transactions.”76 As explained
by Jennifer J. Johnson, the bill was so radically deregulatory,
however, that Wall Street ultimately opposed it out of fear that
“it could have sparked a backlash leading to tougher regulation,”
and the bill was not reported out of committee.77 The following
year, however, Representative Fields reintroduced an amended
bill as the National Securities Markets Improvements Act
(“NSMIA”).78 As enacted, NSMIA preempted state regulation of
offerings under Rule 506 but not under Rule 505.79 The stated rationale for preempting Rule 506 offerings was their purported
national scope.80
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The preemption of state regulation of offerings under Rule 506
but not Rule 505 substantially disrupted Reg. D’s stair-step
approach. Even local and smaller offerings, which might otherwise have proceeded under Rule 505, were channeled into Rule
506 and its “regulatory abyss.”81 Indeed, in light of this disruption, critics attacked NSMIA from both sides, with some scholars
arguing that preemption should extend to Rule 50582 and others
arguing that preemption should be removed from at least some
Rule 506 offerings.83
(c) Increase in Aggregate Offering Price Under Rule
504
The second disruption of Reg. D’s stair-step approach was the
increase in aggregate offering price under Rule 504. In 1980,
when Rule 242 (the predecessor of Rule 505) was adopted, Rule
242 had an aggregate offering price limit of $2 million,84 while
Rule 240 (the predecessor of Rule 504) was limited to $100,000.85
In 1982, when these rules were consolidated into Reg. D, the
Rule 505 limit was raised to $5 million,86 and the Rule 504 limit
was raised to $500,000.87 In 1988, the SEC raised the Rule 504
limit to $1 million, on the condition that “no more than $500,000
of such aggregate offering price is attributable to offers and sales
of securities without registration under a state’s securities laws.”88
In 1992, the SEC removed the state registration condition, instating a ﬂat $1 million aggregate offering price limit.89 Finally, in
2016, the SEC adopted an amendment, effective on January 20,
2017, raising the Rule 504 limit to $5 million.90
This 2016 amendment was the ﬁnal nail in the cofﬁn of Rule
505. As recognized by the SEC, the elimination of any difference
in aggregate offering price limit between Rule 504 and Rule 505
“will signiﬁcantly diminish the utility of Rule 505 and we are
therefore repealing that rule.”91
(d) Obsolescence of Rule 505
These disruptions to Reg. D’s stair-step approach operated
together to render Rule 505 obsolete. Anecdotally, one state securities regulator recently told this author: “If someone calls and
tells me that they’re planning a 505 offering, I know that they
don’t know what they’re doing.” Indeed, the only reason to select
Rule 505 over Rule 506 was to avoid the requirement to assess
the ﬁnancial sophistication of the (up to 35) non-accredited
investors. This reason, not very compelling in and of itself,92 was
further eroded by the possibility that state-level suitability
requirements would apply to an offering under Rule 505.
The data bears this out. From 2009 to 2014, 87.8% of offerings
under Reg. D proceeded under Rule 506; 10.7% proceeded under
Rule 504; and only 1.5% proceeded under Rule 505.93
140

© 2017 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2017

[VOL. 45:2 2017] REST IN PEACE, RULE 505
The SEC’s proposal to eliminate Rule 505 elicited only three
comment letters.94 Commenters agreed that Rule 505 merited
modernization, with suggestions such as raising the aggregate offering price limit, reviewing the information requirements, and
revising the rule to focus on debt-based ﬁnancing.95 After considering these comments, the SEC declined the invitation to modernize Rule 505, repealing it instead.96
III. Legacy of Rule 505
Despite the ultimate obsolescence and repeal of Rule 505, its
legacy should continue to inform policy discussions about exemptions from registration. Rule 505 made lasting impacts to two
components of other oft-used exemptions: the disqualiﬁcation of
bad actors and the substitution of wealth for mandatory
disclosure. Finally, and perhaps most of all, the story of Rule
505’s evolving role within Reg. D demonstrates the importance of
considering the utility of exemptions in context.
(a) Introduction of “Bad Actor” Disqualiﬁcation into
Regulation D
Of the three rules that were replaced by Reg. D, Rule 242 (the
predecessor of Rule 505) was the only one with a provision
disqualifying bad actors.97 When the SEC adopted Reg. D, it
retained this distinction, with only Rule 505 including a bad actor disqualiﬁcation.98
Commentators criticized the incongruity, in light of Reg. D’s
stair-step approach, of disqualifying bad actors from relying on
Rule 505 but not Rule 506.99 NSMIA, which insulated Rule 506
offerings, but not Rule 505 offerings, from state-level bad actor
disqualiﬁcations, exacerbated this incongruity.
In 1988, at the urging of the NASAA, the SEC solicited comments about whether to add a bad actor disqualiﬁcation to Rule
506.100 The NASAA argued that such a provision might convince
more states to adopt the ULOE.101 Commenters were almost
unanimously opposed to the idea, and the SEC decided not to add
the provision because it was “not clear to the Commission that
the adoption of this proposal would encourage a signiﬁcant
number of additional states to adopt ULOE.”102
In 2010, however, Congress intervened. The Dodd-Frank Act
directed the SEC to add a bad actor disqualiﬁcation to Rule 506,103
and the SEC adopted the provision in 2013.104 Therefore, bad actor disqualiﬁcation, which Rule 505 introduced to Reg. D, will
continue to be a part of Reg. D after Rule 505’s demise.
(b) Substitution of Wealth for Mandatory Disclosure
Rule 242 (the predecessor of Rule 505) was the ﬁrst exemption
to substitute an individual investor’s wealth for mandatory
© 2017 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2017
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disclosure.105 As explained by Howard M. Friedman, “[f]or the
ﬁrst time, wealth alone, unaccompanied by sophistication or, at
least a requirement that the purchaser obtain sophisticated
investment advice, was sufﬁcient to permit one to be targeted to
buy securities without mandatory disclosure of information.”106
Rule 242 accomplished this substitution of wealth for mandatory disclosure in two steps. First, Rule 242 introduced a new
term—“accredited person”—and deﬁned it to include certain
wealthy investors.107 Second, Rule 242 removed the mandatory
disclosure requirement for issuances only to accredited
investors.108
Neither Rule 240 (the predecessor of Rule 504) nor Rule 146
(the predecessor of Rule 506) substituted wealth for mandatory
disclosure. Rule 240 did not mandate any particular disclosure to
investors, relying on state-level regulation.109 Rule 146 mandated
that issuers provide access to, or furnish, speciﬁed information to
all offerees, regardless of their wealth.110
When the SEC adopted Reg. D, it retained the substitution of
wealth for mandatory disclosure in Rule 505 and expanded it to
Rule 506. Like Rule 242, Reg. D deﬁned certain wealthy investors as “accredited,”111 and both Rule 505 and Rule 506 removed
the mandatory disclosure requirement for issuances only to accredited investors. 112 Later, in 1989, the SEC expanded this
substitution so that, even if an issuer sold to both accredited and
non-accredited investors, the issuer was only required to provide
disclosure to the non-accredited investors.113
The rationale for substituting wealth for mandatory disclosure
encompassed two subsidiary assumptions: (1) that the wealthy
are ﬁnancially sophisticated (or at least sophisticated enough to
retain a ﬁnancial representative);114 and (2) that the ﬁnancially
sophisticated possess both the savviness and the bargaining
power to negotiate for adequate disclosure, undercutting the need
to mandate it.115 The ﬁrst of these assumptions, in particular, has
been heavily criticized. As summarized in a 2015 report by SEC
staff, some commentators have “expressed the view that the accredited investor deﬁnition is both over- and under-inclusive
because certain ﬁnancially sophisticated individuals may not
qualify, while wealthy, ﬁnancially unsophisticated individuals
may.”116 In light of these critiques, Congress included a provision
in the Dodd-Frank Act directing the SEC to review, every four
years, the accredited investor deﬁnition as it applies to natural
persons to “determine whether the requirements of the deﬁnition
should be adjusted or modiﬁed for the protection of investors, in
the public interest, and in light of the economy.”117 Therefore,
Rule 505’s legacy—albeit a controversial one—will continue to
inﬂuence policy discussions going forward.
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(c) Essentiality of Considering the Utility of Exemptions in Context
Finally, perhaps Rule 505’s most enduring legacy is the story of
its demise, which starkly demonstrates that the utility of every
exemption must be assessed in comparison to available
alternatives. For example, absent revision, the new federal
crowdfunding exemption is at risk of following Rule 505’s path to
obsolescence.118 In light of the federal crowdfunding exemption’s
relatively low aggregate offering price limit,119 relatively burdensome initial disclosure requirement,120 and ongoing annual reporting requirement,121 issuers may ﬂock to less-burdensome
alternatives.122 Those alternatives include the newly modernized
Rule 147 and the new Rule 147A,123 which correlate with state intrastate crowdfunding exemptions; Rule 504,124 especially in light
of its new aggregate offering price limit of $5 million; and the
recently added Rule 506(c), which permits issuers to engage in
general solicitation and advertising (including on the internet) to
raise an unlimited amount of money from accredited investors.125
Rest in peace, Rule 505; your legacy lives on.
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